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“Power from the People? Driving forces and hindrances”. The project is led by the Norwe-
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to improve the understanding of differences and similarities in the prosumer policies in the 
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Abstract 
This report maps the regulatory features underpinning prosumer activities in Germany. It is 
structured according to a case study design which was developed to compare different 
countries and to draw respective lessons on policies which enable the prosumer uptake. 
With a total installed capacity of 38 GW (2015) PV power has reached a stage of systemic 
importance for the whole power system. Although residential PV (<10 kWp) accounts for 
only 13 percent of total installed PV capacity, it is an important segment for several rea-
sons. “Prosuming” — although never defined as an official term in Germany — is both a 
subject and a driver of the adaptive legislation on the RES support scheme and on system 
integration of RES. It is the result of a dynamic incentive structure set by both regulatory 
provisions as well as by market developments and the permanent interplay between these 
factors, rather than as a result of a targeted prosumer policy. Thus, the challenge this case 
study is confronted with is to map these factors and their respective interplay over a ra-
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Germany is perceived as a frontrunner in the transforming of its electricity system from a 
fossil and nuclear fuel-based system into an energy system based on renewables. Key legis-
lation which has shaped the specific course of Germany’s energy transition was first enact-
ed back in 2000. It has since been adapted several times to meet the new requirements of 
system and market integration of renewables and further market and societal develop-
ments. These developments have also had implications for the occurrence and growth of 
prosumers. 
This report maps the regulatory features underpinning prosumer activities in Germany. It is 
structured according to a case study design which was developed to compare different 
countries and to draw respective lessons on policies which enable the prosumer uptake. 
The first section of this paper provides background information about the wider energy 
context within which the development of prosuming took place in Germany. The second 
section focuses on particular policies, regulatory provisions and market developments spe-
cific to the growth in the number of prosumers, specifically domestic solar PV system own-
ers.  
The most striking feature of the German energy transition is, that it is characterized by 
the rise of new, decentrally organized energy actors, specifically small-scale investors in 
renewables such as private households, farmers and citizen energy cooperatives. This is 
particularly so in the segment of photovoltaics in which the above mentioned actors ac-
counted for about 46 percent of installed PV capacity in 2012 (trend:research/Leuphana 
2013). Photovoltaics is the fastest growing renewable energy source in the residential sec-
tor not only in Germany, but worldwide. 
Most German residential PV system operators meanwhile also consume a certain proportion 
of the electricity they have produced on-site. Thus, they fulfil the main criteria for being 
characterized as prosumers according to a commonly used definition: The term “prosumer” 
emerged in the 1980s in the digital business industry, where it was used to describe users 
who also created their own online products and services (IEA-RETD 2014: 13). Adapted to 
electricity industry the term refers to consumers who also produce their own power from 
on-site generation (ibid.). 
However, the concept of a prosumer has not yet been officially used in German energy pol-
icy. Although the political incentives that were set triggered in particular micro-generation 
by households, their main objective was in fact to stimulate RES production more widely. 
The German renewable energy policy is motivated by climate protection concerns, and 
specifically the desire to transform a CO2-intensive energy system into a low carbon energy 
system without further use of nuclear power. Households and other small-scale actors 
were more responsive than the established actors in the energy field to the regulatory 
framework which included a support scheme for renewables.  
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Prosuming in Germany needs to be analyzed against the backdrop of the core motivation of 
German energy policy: to organize a low carbon transformation of the whole energy sys-
tem. With this motivation in mind, it appears understandable that a dedicated stimulation 
of prosumer uptake has never been the overarching goal of energy transition efforts. In 
fact, up until 2009 it was mandatory to feed into the grid any renewable electricity remu-
nerated within the German Feed-in-Tariff scheme.  
Consequently, the self-consumption aspect, which is a constituent element of the term 
“prosuming” (see above), was never explicitly desired in Germany in the early phase of the 
transition process (with the exception of a short period of time for grid stability reasons). 
However, the achievement of grid parity in around the year 2012 provided the economic 
rationale for self-consumption of residential PV power and, consequently, prosuming be-
came a new business model for the whole solar branch in Germany. 
In current debates on what is required to manage the challenges Germany is confronted 
with right at the beginning of a new phase of the power system transformation process, 
however, prosuming is not uncontested. Distributed power generation on the one hand, 
and a more decentralized consumption in the form of a certain degree of grid defection on 
the other, has consequences for the future architecture and functioning of a formerly cen-
tralized electricity system, as well as for the respective actor structures in the energy 
field. The consumers’ engagement in the production and self-consumption of electricity 
causes changes in their established relationship with traditional actors in the energy field 
— the energy utilities and grid operators — dependent on the level of production and the 
degree of self-consumption or “autarky”.  
The current German debate on prosuming consequently centers on the issues of grid stabil-
ity, system integration of the increased amount of distributed and volatile renewable en-
ergy sources and on grid-optimized demand and feed-in management, as well as on the so-
cietal costs of the transition.  
Meanwhile, prosuming has established itself in Germany. It is the result of a dynamic in-
centive structure set by both regulatory provisions as well as by market developments and 
the permanent interplay between these factors, rather than as a result of a targeted 
prosumer policy. Thus, the challenge this case study is confronted with is to map these 
factors and their respective interplay over a rather long period compared, for example, 
with the very recent efforts in Norway to stimulate a prosumer uptake. 
Against the backdrop of the lack of a targeted prosumer policy and of a formal use or even 
definition of the term “prosuming” in Germany this study, furthermore, had to solve the 
problem of identifying relevant data as official statistics do not refer to the term. The fol-
lowing approach was used for the purpose of this study in order to select and to combine 
relevant data concerning residential PV prosumers.  
The typical size of residential small-scale PV systems is a maximum PV system’s capacity 
of <10 kWp. This nominal capacity is relevant, as all official statistics in Germany on in-
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stalled capacity of RES distinguish according to the system size and not according to own-
ership. Thus, the PV system size of <10 kWp will be used in this paper as a proxy for resi-
dential PV.  
In 2014 this segment below 10 kWp accounted for 56 percent of all PV systems installed in 
Germany, which is in practice an absolute figure of 850,000 PV systems (1.5 million PV sys-
tems in total). In terms of the total installed PV capacity in 2014 (around 38 GW) the seg-
ment of PV systems below 10 kWp accounts for 13 percent (5,062 MW). 
1 Mapping the contextual background of the national energy sector 
1.1 Historical developments and national energy transition efforts1  
Since the 19th century coal constituted the main energy source for power generation in 
Germany. The Ruhr Valley mining area became Germany’s core industrial region, shaping 
cultural and economic development at that time. In the 1950s the use of oil and nuclear 
power became more common, while the use of coal started to decline. In the 1970s nucle-
ar power began to become the target of major national public protest and a grassroots 
movement evolved.2 In the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and triggered by the 
greening of the electorate, in the 1990s Germany began to establish a legal framework in 
order to promote the deployment of renewable energies. With the Electricity Feed-In Act 
of 1991 and the adoption of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) in 2000, the basic policy in-
struments were created to politically prioritize green over conventional power (Hake et al. 
2015). 
The first agreement to phase-out Germany’s nuclear plants was reached in 2000 under the 
Social Democrat-Green coalition. Even though this decision was reversed in 20103 by the 
then new conservative-liberal government, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima one year lat-
er prompted the same government — driven in particular by Chancellor Merkel’s respon-
siveness to the anti-nuclear public mood — to agree on a renewed nuclear phase-out.  
Although key legislation regarding the energy transition, such as the Renewable Energy 
Act, were enacted a decade earlier, the policy known worldwide as the Energiewende (en-
ergy turnaround) is often attributed to the decisions made in 2011 by the conservative-
liberal government. Immediately after the Fukushima disaster, the government shut down 
                                            
 
1  For an excellent and detailed overview of the historical background of the German energy transition please 
see Hake et al. 2015. 
2  The German anti-nuclear movement evolved into one of the origins of the Green Party, which was founded 
in 1980 in West Germany. 
3  In 2009 the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats were elected. Under pressure from the new liberal 
coalition partner (FDP), the new government decided to follow a market-oriented approach to energy and 
climate policy that treats all low carbon technologies equally instead of “discriminating” in favour of some 
technologies in order to achieve climate targets. Consequently the government rejected the nuclear phase-
out and announced significant extensions to the lifetimes of existing nuclear power plants. 
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the country’s seven oldest nuclear power plants and appointed an “Ethics Commission for a 
Safe Energy Supply”, which was mandated to prepare a political consensus on nuclear poli-
cy in Germany after Fukushima (see Schreurs 2014). The commission’s recommendation to 
phase out nuclear energy by 2021 legitimized the final phase-out of nuclear power, adopt-
ed by a decision by the cabinet in June 2011. 
On the basis of the Ethics Commission’s recommendations and important policy decisions 
made by the German Bundestag, the pathway to a low-carbon energy system was to rely 
upon the following milestones: a nuclear phase-out, an increase in RES in the energy mix, 
and increased energy efficiency. In 2013 the new “Grand Coalition” government adjusted 
the official target, which had been adopted in 2011, to increase the share of renewable 
energies in the German power mix to 40-45 percent by 2025 and 55-60 percent by 2035. 
The coalition added legal provisions for the definition of corridors or caps on annual capac-
ity additions by RES technology. 
1.2 The technical system and the energy market 
1.2.1 Electricity production 
In 2015 Germany’s total gross electricity production reached around 647 TWh. With a share 
of approximately 42 percent, coal (hard coal and lignite) still dominates the power mix, 
but the importance of renewables is increasing, with a share of 29 percent. Nuclear power, 
which is to be phased-out by 2022, has become less significant, accounting for only 14 per-
cent of the total power production in 2015 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1:  The German Power Mix in 2015 
 
Source: Own illustration based on BMWI Energiedaten, (n.d.) version 05.01.2016, table 22. 
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Germany is the country with the highest share of renewable power — mostly photovoltaics 
(PV) and wind — in Europe in terms of installed capacity. Distributed over 1.5 million pow-
er plants, the total nominal power of installed PV increased to approximately 38.5 GW in 
the year of 2014, thereby contributing significantly to Germany’s power supply (Fraunhofer 
ISE 2015). 
1.2.2 Consumption and electricity prices 
Consumption pattern 
Electricity consumption by industry accounts for half of the total consumption, whereas 
the residential sector and smaller business customers each account for about a quarter of 
electricity consumption (Agora Energiewende 2015). Electricity in private households ac-
counted for 19 percent of final energy consumption in the household sector (Arbeitsge-
meinschaft Energiebilanzen 2014). 
Compared to 2008, Germany aims to reduce its gross electricity consumption by 10 percent 
by 2020. In 2014, gross electricity consumption was 576.3 TWh, which was 3.8 percent less 
than in 2013 (Agora Energiewende 2015). Although electricity consumption in general has 
been declining for about a decade (BDEW 2014), the electricity consumption of private 
households in the period of 1990 to 2013 rose by 18.1 percent (Bundesumweltamt 2015). 
However, the increase of electricity consumption in the household sector can be attributed 
to the increase in the number of households, while the average household size is decreas-
ing. According to statistical data in 2014 there were 40.2 million households in Germany, 
single and two-person households accounted for 75 percent. Single households account for 
41 percent of all German households, their share increased in the last 10 years by about 
9 percent (Destatis 2016). The average electricity consumption in the German household 
sector is about 3,100 kWh/a.  
About half of German households live in rented apartments or houses. The home-ownership 
rate was just 52.5 percent which, compared to other European countries, is rather low 
(Eurostat 2013). 
Electricity prices 
Electricity prices have risen for both households and industrial customers over the past 
years. A great portion (but not all) of these price increases can be attributed to the cost of 
the energy transition — in particular increases in the so-called EEG surcharge4. The burden 
of the EEG surcharge is distributed among the various consumer groups, whereby non-
                                            
 
4  The EEG surcharge is added to the price of electricity per kWh consumed and serves to cover the additional 
costs of promoting electricity generated from renewable energy sources. 
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privileged consumer groups5, such as private households bear the highest economic burden 
(Mayer and Burden 2014; see Figure 2).  
The debate on the social acceptability and affordability of the energy transition in Germa-
ny has focused on the level of the EEG surcharge and its fairness. Against the backdrop of 
the lack of a comparably fierce public debate on rising prices for other household energy 
carriers (gas, heating oil, petrol) it becomes obvious that the strong governmental regula-
tion of electricity prices serves as a kind of invitation to politically renegotiate adminis-
tered price components, while other price components or rising prices for other energy 
carriers that are contingent on anonymous market mechanisms escape such influence (for 
a critical discussion see Gawel et al. 2016). 
In general, German’s residential consumers pay among the highest electricity prices in Eu-
rope, topped only by household electricity prices in Denmark.  
Figure 2:  Development of German average household electricity prices 2007-2015  
 
Source: Own illustration based on BDEW 2015 
                                            
 
5  Non-privileged consumers are those who pay the full EEG surcharge. In contrast to these consumer groups 
exemptions to the EEG surcharge are granted to German electricity-intensive companies for reasons of in-
ternational competitiveness.  
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Figure 3:  Composition of the German average household electricity price in 2015 
 
Source:  Own illustration based BDEW 2015 
1.2.3 Status of smart meter rollout in Germany  
The main driver for the introduction of smart metering was the EU regulation on the liber-
alization of the electricity market, energy efficiency policy and — associated with both — 
the legal provisions for the introduction of smart tariff structures, which offer customers 
active participation in the liberalized market and/or electricity suppliers and energy ser-
vice providers active demand-side management.6  
                                            
 
6  Directive 2006/32/EC (Art 13) on energy-use efficiency and energy services envisages the introduction of 
“…individual meters that accurately reflect the final customer’s actual energy consumption and that pro-
vide information on actual time of use.” Directive 2005/89/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council from 18 January 2006 concerning measures to safeguard security of electricity supply and infra-
structure investment also envisages, among other measures to be taken by Member States, the “encour-
agement of the adoption of real-time demand management technologies such as advanced metering sys-
tems” (Art 5, 2d). Additionally, the Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity states in Article 3 (11): “In order to promote energy efficiency, Member States, or when the 
Member State has so provided, the regulatory authority shall strongly recommend that electricity under-
takings optimise the use of electricity, for example by providing energy management services, developing 
innovative pricing formulas or introducing intelligent metering systems or smart grids where appropriate”. 
In addition, Member States have to “ensure the implementation of intelligent metering systems that shall 
assist the active participation of consumers in the electricity/gas supply market…”. Furthermore, the EC 
Directive 2009/72/EC obliged each Member State to carry out a cost-benefit assessment (CBA) to evaluate 
the feasibility of a large-scale smart meter rollout (at least 80 percent of consumers subject to smart me-
tering by 2020). 
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Via an amendment of the German Energy Industry Act (EnWG) in 2008 and the introduction 
of a law on the liberalization of metering, the regulator transposed basic EU provisions into 
German law. The regulator exclusively relied on market dynamics, in particular on the de-
mands of final electricity users (Tews 2011a: 22pp). However, it became clear relatively 
early, that this was far too minimal an incentive to trigger a large-scale rollout of smart 
meters. 
Thus, since the amendment of the Energy Industry Act (§21c, EnWG) in 2011 the regulator 
has an obligation to install smart meters for the following cases: 
• final consumers with annual electricity consumption over 6000 kWh,  
• new generation facilities pursuant to the national Renewable Energy Act and the 
Combined Heat and Power Act with an installed capacity of >7 kWp, and  
• final consumers in new and renovated buildings (this provision is due to be abol-
ished by the next reform of the EnWG). 
According to the provisions of the EnWG (2011) smart metering should enable consumers to 
better participate in the market by offering them a choice of smart tariffs (time-of-use, 
etc.). Furthermore, it should ensure transparency and control of the electricity consump-
tion by the final user in order to tap energy efficiency and cost saving potentials. 
In November 2015 the cabinet adopted the government’s draft bill on “The Digitization of 
the Energy Transition”. In contrast to most other EU member states, Germany will not pur-
sue a large-scale rollout of smart meters or smart metering systems. The German cost-
benefit analysis according to EU Directive 2009/72/EC (Ernst & Young 2013) did not rec-
ommend such a large-scale rollout targeting all households by 2020 as the costs of smart 
metering systems for final users with low levels of annual consumption would far outweigh 
the average potential for annual energy and cost savings. A rollout of at least basic smart 
meters and/or advanced metering systems is expected to start in 2017 in a step-by-step 
manner. It will prioritize large consumers with greater energy saving and load shifting po-
tentials. The installation of at least basic smart meters, however, should be finalized for 
all consumers by 2032. The draft bill also introduces price/cost caps for the installation 
and operation of smart meters, based on a cost-benefit analysis, which considers the cost 
of the smart meters and the benefits they offer in terms of savings and load-shifting (see 
Figure 4 and Table 1, page 22). Following public consultation the law has been adopted by 
parliament (Bundestag) on the 23th of June 2016. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is sched-
uled to finalize the law on the 8th of July 2016. 
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Figure 4:  Time schedule and cost caps for smart meter rollout according to govern-
mental plans7 
 
Source: Illustration adapted (translation) from BMWi – homepage: FAQ concerning draft bill on the “Digitization 
of the energy transition”: http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Netze-und-
Netzausbau/intelligente-messsysteme,did=726780.html?view=renderPrint, accessed, 09.02.2016. 
1.3 Main actors in the energy field at a glance  
1.3.1  Energy policy actors 
The regulatory framework for energy policy is developed at federal level. However, Ger-
many is a multilevel federal system, thus, the subnational level does not only implement 
federal law, but also enjoys legal, administrative and budgetary competencies. States, 
counties or municipalities can, for example, specify their own renewable energy policy 
targets and adequate policies and measures to achieve them. Particularly relevant for the 
deployment of RES — especially for those renewables with a spatial impact — are the sub-
national level’s competencies with regard to spatial planning.  
The most obvious political challenge of the current energy transition process is a lack of 
multi-level coordination, due to the multiplicity of renewable energy expansion strategies 
made by municipalities, counties, regional states and the federal government, which often 
hardly relate to one another. So far, governments in different jurisdictions have primarily 
                                            
 
7  The adopted bill now contains some deviations to the schedule defined in the draft bill which are relevant 
for small prosumer installations below 7 kWp. See section 2.3.4) 
by 2017: consumers >100,000 kWh/a: without cost cap
by 2017: consumer 50,000-100,000kWh and producer 50-100 kW:200 €/a
by 2017: consumer 20,000-50,000 kWh and producer 30-50kW:170 €/a
by 2017: consumer 10,000-20,000 kWh and producer 15-30 kW:130 €/a
by 2017: producer 7 -15 kW: 100 €/a
by 2020:  producer >100 kW: without cost cap
by 2020: consumer 6,000-10,000 kWh/a:100 €/a
by 2020: consumer 4,000-6,000 kWh/a: 60 €/a
by 2020: consumer 3,000-4,000 kWh/a: 40 €/a
by 2020: consumer 2,000-3,000 kWh/a: 30 €/a
by 2020: consumer >2,000 kWh/a: 23 €/a
Option: meter 
operators can extend 
roll-out if they comply 
with cost caps  
Cost caps base on a cost-benefit-analysis and include current metering charges of 20€/a 
for consumers and 30€/a for producers
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followed their own interests when making decisions about renewable energy targets and 
implementation policies (for more information see Ohlhorst et al. 2013; Klagge and Arbach 
2013; Schreurs and Steuwer 2015). 
At the federal level, primary responsibility for the electricity sector lies with the Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, or 
BMWi), although the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building 
and Nuclear Safety (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicher-
heit, or BMUB) has some competencies in the electricity industry as well. 
1.3.2 Independent regulatory authorities  
In the course of the liberalization of the European energy markets, the German electricity 
market began to open up in 1998, allowing new actors to enter the market for the sale of 
electricity and provision of services. In addition to the core EU-level regulation, the super-
vision of competition at all levels of the market continued to be responsibility of the Fed-
eral Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt, or BkartA). The Federal Network Agency (Bundesnet-
zagentur, or BnetzA) is responsible for the regulation of natural monopolies such as grids, 
telecommunications, postal services, etc. The BnetzA’s central task in the energy field is 
to ensure non-discriminatory third-party access to the grids and to authorize calculations 
on the network charges made by grid operators. The BnetzA and the regulatory authorities 
at the state level are responsible for expansion and/or optimization of the electricity 
grids. Both agencies fall under the authority of the BMWi.  
1.3.3 Energy industry actors: incumbents and challengers 
Even though Germany has unbundled large parts of its electricity generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail activities, the four large power companies E.ON, RWE, EnBW and 
Vattenfall are still the “big” players in the power market. However, due to the growing 
share of renewables in the power mix, the ownership profile of electricity production has 
changed. The price-based support scheme for RES (Renewable Energy Act, see section 
2.1.1) functioned as a shelter, allowing small-scale renewable electricity producers to de-
velop in a niche. For the “big four” the returns on investment were apparently not seen as 
high enough to encourage investment in the then niche segment of the electricity market. 
However, faced with increasing losses in their traditional business and with RES becoming 
less niche, these incumbent actors realized the need to adapt their strategies to the new 
reality of the electricity market (Kungl 2015). It is important to note that in Germany 
there is still a substantial difference between the ownership profiles of conventional and 
renewable electricity generation. Whereas the “big four” own most conventional genera-
tion, they only hold a share of 5 percent of renewable resources (Agora Energiewende 
2015). New actors have challenged established patterns of domestic energy policy interac-
tion through experimentation and innovation at a decentralized level (Beermann and Tews 
2015). According to a survey carried out by trend:research GmbH and the Leuphana Uni-
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versität Lüneburg (2013) nearly half (46.6 percent) of the total RES capacity installed in 
Germany is owned by citizens and citizens’ energy cooperatives.  
In the transmission sector, the key players are the four regionally fixed transmission grid 
operators (TGO) TenneT TSO GmbH, Amprion GmbH, 50 Hertz Transmission GmbH and 
TransnetBW GmbH.  
The distribution and the supply branches are more complex and are characterized by a vast 
number of companies. Approximately 900 distribution grid operators (DGO), including the 
four major companies, as well as around 700 municipal utilities (Stadtwerke) currently 
serve 20,000 municipalities (Agora Energiewende 2015).  
There is an ongoing trend to re-municipalize distribution grids, i.e. energy services are be-
ing returned to public municipal management. This move has been buttressed by the expi-
ry after 20 years (since the Energy Industry Act (EnWG)) of many of the so-called “conces-
sion agreements” - private law contracts between municipalities and contractors for the 
use and operation of local distribution grids. Several thousand “concessions” for operating 
electricity grids will be newly awarded within the next few years. A number of municipal 
utilities (Stadtwerke) have become crucial drivers for local innovation. In some cases mu-
nicipal energy utilities have even been re-founded by citizens and local political actors to 
serve as decentralized local innovator in support of the renewable energy transition from 
below and to create added value at the local level (Beermann and Tews 2015). 
2 Prosumer-relevant framework conditions in Germany 
This section identifies the regulatory features and predominantly politically induced mar-
ket developments that are relevant for prosuming, as there are regulations and market de-
velopments that: 
• enable or constrain private household investment in on-site RES, and in particular 
PV 
• enable or constrain connection to the grid for the feeding in of RES power, and  
• enable or constrain self-consumption of power produced. 
2.1 Incentives for households to invest in micro-generation 
As early as 1990 the German government and the sub-national states (Bundesländer) had 
adopted a globally unique PV subsidy program in order to test the practical functionality of 
small, decentralized, grid-connected PV systems, the “1,000 roofs program”. Addressees of 
that program were first-mover households, for whom up to 70 percent of the costs of a 
small PV system (1-5 kWp) were subsidized. This program ran until 1995 and induced 
around 2,000 PV installations on the roofs of detached and semi-detached houses. The sub-
sidy was linked to an obligation to submit the yield data of one’s system for scientific 
evaluation of the maturity of the technology. Despite the rather high funding rate of 70 
percent, households still had to make a personal contribution of on average around 10,000 
EUR for a small 2.6 kWp PV system (Hoffmann 2008). Therefore, it is worth highlighting 
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that this investment was mainly made by early “pioneer” adopters without a realistic ex-
pectation of financial returns.  
Another predecessor of the cost-covering remuneration scheme and a further milestone in 
the upscaling of PV in Germany was the Feed-in-Law (Stromeinspeisegesetz) passed in 
1991, which set the first remuneration for PV electricity fed into the grid at an average of 
8.5ct/kWh. Compared with the then PV power generation costs of 90 ct/kWh this first 
feed-in-tariff was not really meant as an economic incentive to attract a large number of 
investors. It was the pioneers, who engaged in this “uneconomic” investment. However, in 
1999 a new grant program was enacted — the so-called “100,000 roofs program”. The pro-
gram supported the installation of PV systems larger than 1 kWp. Loans, with interest rates 
of 4.5 percent below market conditions, were offered with a repayment period of ten 
years and two years of deferred payments. The program aimed to develop 300 MW of addi-
tional capacity. At the end of the program in July 2003 55,000 installations and 261 MW of 
additional capacity had been supported. 
The most fundamental shift from experimentation to a broader market diffusion program 
of this technology occurred in 2000 with the adoption of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG). 
It was from the very beginning a very fine-tuned legal framework, which mixed diverse 
policy instruments to stimulate the wide deployment of renewable energy sources.  
2.1.1 Basic provisions of the Renewable Energy Act enabling investment in RES by 
households 
The rapid increase of RES in Germany’s power mix over the past decades can be attributed 
to favorable political framework conditions and is a key component of the country’s well-
known energy transition (“Energiewende”). 
The EEG is the main instrument for stimulating RES deployment in Germany. The EEG was 
adopted in 2000 and so far underwent four amendments in 2004, 2009, 2012 and 2014.  
The basic provisions of the law comprise: 
• a support scheme for electricity from renewables 
• a purchase obligation for grid operators, and 
• the solidarity principle in bearing the cost for RES deployment. 
Until the most recent reform of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) in 2014, Germany has ap-
plied a price-based support scheme for RES.8 Support schemes for renewables can general-
                                            
 
8  In 2014 the support scheme underwent a fundamental instrumental shift. Direct marketing became manda-
tory for all newly installed renewable energy facilities with a capacity of more than 500 kW (by August 
2014) and 100 kW (by January 2016). In addition, instead of the existing feed-in tariff or premium tariff, by 
2017, the level of support granted will be determined by a competitive bidding process. Thus, Germany has 
introduced a volume-based auction system, which differs fundamentally from the previous price-based sup-
port scheme with administratively fixed prices for RES. However, small-scale residential RES producers are 
still exempted from this instrumental shift (for more details on drivers and implications of this instrumental 
shift, see Tews 2015). 
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ly be divided into either price-based or volume-based schemes (ecofys 2014). In contrast to 
volume-based support schemes that determine quantity targets for the expansion of RES 
(e.g. quota and auction systems), the support level for price-based schemes is administra-
tively fixed; either independently of the market price by a set remuneration for every kWh 
of RES electricity produced, as in the case of a guaranteed feed-in tariff (FIT), or linked to 
the market price with an additional fixed or floating premium, the so-called feed-in pre-
mium (FIP). For a long period, the German support scheme was based solely on a FIT, 
which guaranteed producers a set remuneration depending on the specific RES technology 
for a certain time period (usually 20 years). In 2012 the FIT was supplemented by the in-
troduction of a floating FIP, which producers could choose as an option, in order to stimu-
late the market integration of RES.  
Figure 5:  Total installed RES-E capacity 1990-2014 
 
Source: Own illustration based on data from BMWI Energiedaten (n.d.) 
This price-based support scheme was complemented by a purchase guarantee and priority 
feeding into the grid of renewable electricity. Thus, grid operators were obliged to accept 
renewable electricity from third parties, feed it into the electricity grid and pay RES pro-
ducers fixed prices.  
The support scheme is financed by the so-called EEG surcharge on electricity consumed in 
kWh (solidarity principle). The EEG surcharge has to be paid by all electricity consumers 
who are not exempted by means of a special regulation (e.g. energy intensive industry). 
The surcharge is calculated annually by the transmission grid operators and reflects the 
differential between the grid operator’s expenditures for funding payments to RES opera-
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tors and their revenues from selling RES electricity on the wholesale market. As of 2016, 
the surcharge amounts to 6.354 euro-cent/kWh (see also Figure 2).  
The provisions of the EEG (as introduced in 2000) offered conditions that enabled private 
households’ investment in on-site RE capacity. 
Firstly these provisions reduced the risks for investors through: 
• fixed prices per kWh fed into the grid over 20 years, and  
• technology-specific remuneration rates according to maturity of the technology. 
As risk reduction is most relevant for those actors who cannot diversify risk, these provi-
sions offered favorable conditions for investment in RES by small actors, such as house-
holds or small enterprises.  
Secondly, further provisions, such as the purchase obligation for grid operators and the 
priority access for RES to the grid, minimized the transaction costs associated with the 
selling of RES. Low transaction costs in the trading of power are particularly relevant for 
new actors who are unfamiliar with the established rules in the energy field or market.  
Figure 6:  Annually installed PV capacity according to system size 2000-2014—
changes in structures (investors?) of newly added PV capacity/a over time 
 
Source:  Own illustration based on data compiled from ZSW 2014 (2000-2013) and Proteus Solutions GBR (2014) 
and BMWI Energiedaten (n.d.) (total installed PV capacity/year in MW) 
Thus, the Renewable Energy Act has offered a high degree of planning security for inves-
tors. It has sheltered small-scale and new actors’ investments and fostered small-scale 
RES-growth in a niche for over a decade. 
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This can be seen in the development of annually installed capacity according to system 
size (Figure 6).  
While at the beginning of the process newly added capacity mainly took the form of small-
scale PV systems, the situation has since changed. In 2014 small-scale investment account-
ed for only 20 percent of newly added capacity. However, regarding the absolute number 
of annually added installations, systems below 10 kWp still very much dominate. 
Figure 6 clearly shows how important the provisions of the EEG were in stimulating small-
scale investment by private actors. The EEG politically pushed the market diffusion of this 
technology; small-scale actors’ — in particular German households’ — investments in roof-
mounted PV encouraged further technological innovations in PV systems and decreased the 
price of PV systems. 
Figure 7:  Almost half of installed PV capacity is “citizen energy”/“power from the 
people” 
 
 Source: Own illustration based on trend:research/Leuphana 2013.  
Annotation: The group “citizen energy” comprises individual private owners (single households, farm-
ers and small cooperatives which install an RES plant/PV system in their region). Energy cooperatives 
are only characterized as such in cases where the citizen’s investment is at least 50 percent and inves-
tors come from the region where the RE plant is installed. The group “institutional and strategic in-
vestors” comprises investors such as banks, funds and insurance companies as well as players from in-
dustry and business, for example agro-businesses and project developers. The group “energy utilities” 
comprises the traditional “big four” energy utilities as well as regional/municipal and international 
energy utilities. 
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This is one of the most striking features of the German energy transition; that it was main-
ly driven by new actors — private individuals and energy cooperatives — producing so-
called “citizen energy”. According to the only available ownership analysis of the German 
RES market, in the photovoltaic segment “citizen energy” accounted for almost 50 percent 
of total installed capacity in 2012 (trend:research/Leuphana2013) (Figure 7). 
2.1.2 Diverse additional grants for PV at the federal and sub-national level  
In contrast to other countries which replaced grant-based financial support for renewables 
with more comprehensive economic instruments, such as volume- or price-based support 
schemes for electricity fed into the grid, in Germany parallel to the FIT/P scheme there 
still exist diverse investment support schemes at the federal and sub-national level for PV, 
CHP generation or other techniques and technologies relevant to the reduction of CO2 
emissions. The current grant for PV system installations offered by the public KFW bank9 is 
applied only for grid-connected systems and is additionally coupled with the requirement 
for a storage system or DSM enabling technology. The current program design reflects the 
requirements of a new phase in the transition process — to integrate distributed electricity 
into the system for security of supply reasons.  
2.1.3 Regulatory developments which worsen investment conditions for households  
The Renewable Energy Act has from the very beginning involved a kind of degression in the 
remuneration rates according to the decreasing system costs, i.e. the maturity of the re-
spective technology. Thus, the feed-in tariff an investor can expect depends on the time at 
which the PV system/plant was commissioned. From this point on the investor receives this 
specific remuneration over the coming twenty years.  
In the early phase of the support scheme, the remuneration rates for PV were rather high, 
according to some critics they were much too high, which instigated a boom in the PV 
market. But this boom also caused a large increase in the EEG surcharge, and thus a lot of 
discussion about over-subsidization, social fairness and the erosion of the solidarity princi-
ple.  
Consequently, the government announced in 2012 that the FIT for PV would be discontin-
ued when a total cap of 52 GW installed PV capacity is reached (at the moment 38 GW PV 
have been installed). In addition the government introduced in 2014 a soft cap of 2.4-2.6 
GW per year and a responsive degression framework, i.e. a decline in the FIT on a monthly 
basis in response to the performance of the cap (flexible ceilings/corridors); these 
measures were both to stay in place until the point that the total cap was reached. 
                                            
 
9   The German Bank KfW (“Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau”) is one of the world’s leading promotional banks. 
It is committed to improving economic, social and ecological living conditions in Germany and around the 
world on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany and the federal states. 
Prosumer: country report Germany 17 
 
 
If the rate of solar power expansion is placed within this defined annual corridor, then a 
basic degression in the remuneration of 0.5 percent per month is defined. However, if 
more PV power is added beyond the defined annual cap, the degression of the FIT will be 
raised too. Should less PV be added than defined in the annual corridor then there will be 
a degression lower than 0.5 percent or no degression at all (§13 EEG 2014). The rate of de-
gression is calculated by the German Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Tele-
communications, Post and Railway (Bundesnetzagentur). Since September 2015 the remu-
neration rate for small residential PV systems of <10kWp has not changed and remains at 
12.31ct/kWh (Bundesnetzagentur 2016). This indicates a lower amount of annually added 
PV than defined in the annual corridor: between December 2014 and November 2015 only 
1.4 GW of PV power was added (ibid). 
Figure 8:  Decrease in annually added PV capacity due to the degression in remuner-
ation rates 
 
Source:  Own illustration based on data from https://www.netztransparenz.de (remuneration rates); ZSW 2014 
(installed PV capacity <10 kWp/year). 
In the past, in particular since 2012, the degression in the remuneration rates has already 
caused a massive drop in investment in PV capacity in the residential sector (Figure 8). 
This can be interpreted as a rise in uncertainty among residential investors as the revenue 
calculation becomes increasingly risky due to (theoretically) monthly changing remunera-
tion rates and very low remuneration rate for PV. 
The drop in the PV market is, however, not restricted to small residential PV systems but 
applies also to larger PV systems. Remuneration rates decreased to an extent, which can-
not be compensated by the equally decreasing PV system prices (Figure 9). Thus, there is 
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in general greater economic uncertainty across the entire German PV market. For residen-
tial systems, a study has even calculated that newly installed small systems can no longer 
operate economically without a relatively high share of self-consumption (ZSW 2014: 37). 
Figure 9:  Uncertainty in the PV market due to the decrease in remuneration rates 
 
Source: Own illustration based on an illustration in BSW Solar 2014: Positionspapier des Bundesverbandes So-
larwirtschaft e.V. zur EEG Novelle 2014, May 2014, page 1. 
2.2 Incentives that enable or restrict households’ self-consumption of the 
electricity they produce 
Almost all PV systems in Germany are grid-connected systems instead of off-grid systems. 
Originally self-consumption was not intended when the regulator introduced the Renewa-
ble Energy Act in 2000. All generated electricity, subject to the EEG-support scheme, was 
obliged to be fed into the grid. According to the transmission grid operators’ projections, 
self-consumption in the whole PV segment will also be marginal in the future (Figure 10). 
For smaller PV systems, the situation has completely changed compared to the earlier 
phases of the FIT-scheme — now self-consumption becomes necessary to operate economi-
cally. 
However, self-consumption of PV is highly contested in the debate about the cost-
efficiency and social fairness of the German transition process — for different reasons. This 
section will, first, provide a brief overview of the development of the regulations, which 
are relevant for self-consumption against the backdrop of the economy of self-
consumption. It will then discuss relevant framework conditions, e.g. how to increase the 
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rate of self-consumption, and finally the pros and cons of self-consumption, with special 
reference to the German debate. 
Figure 10:  Share of self-consumption of solar power in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on the transmission grid operators’ annual projections (PROGNOSE DER EEG-
UMLAGE NACH  AUSGLMECHV, 2010-2015) and https://www.netztransparenz.de/de/file/2014-11-
11_EEG_Mifri_bis_2019.pdf 2016-2019). 
2.2.1 Interplay between regulation and market development relevant for self-
consumption of PV power in households  
Up until 2009 all PV power had to be fed into the grid. High remuneration rates have trig-
gered an extreme increase in PV production, especially from smaller distributed PV sys-
tems (compare Figure 6). Compared to the massive expansion of new distributed and vola-
tile power capacities, the distribution and transmission grids were not sufficiently adapted 
to the challenges associated with integrating these volatile capacities at the same speed. 
Thus, in 2009, a so-called “self-consumption bonus” was introduced by the regulator in the 
context of the second reform of the EEG. This bonus was intended to stimulate self-
consumption in order to prevent grid overload. The self-consumption bonus even allowed 
producers of solar power to receive a payment from the support scheme (a reduced FIT 
rate) for the power they did not feed into the grid but consumed at home.  
For prosumers, thus, it became economically more attractive to consume a portion of their 
own electricity instead of feeding all PV power into the grid, as the self-consumption bo-
nus, plus the reduced costs for electricity purchased from the grid, guaranteed a surplus. 
However, the intended effect of reducing the risk of grid overload was not achieved — and 
perhaps is not achievable. Most of the PV system operators could not significantly increase 
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the rate of self-consumption due to the absence of storage capacities (high cost of battery 
systems) or due to the low potential for load shifting in the household sector. Therefore, 
the self-consumption bonus predominantly caused windfall effects. 
Figure 11:  The economy of self-consumption: grid parity 
 
Source:  Own illustration based on BMWI Energiedaten (n.d.) (prices) and https://www.netztransparenz.de 
(remuneration rates).  
 Annotation: Retail prices for electricity in Germany traditionally consist of a basic component, which 
is independent of the amount of consumed, and a price per kWh consumed, the “working price”. For 
an exact calculation of the grid parity it would have been better to use only the “working price” for 
electricity consumed, as also prosumers will always have to pay the basic component as long as they 
consume power from the grid. However, due to a lack of available data and transparency on the com-
position of the retail price, I have used the retail price as it is as a proxy for this illustration of grid 
parity.  
Consequently, the self-consumption-bonus was phased out in the third reform of the EEG in 
2012. The bonus was no longer necessary as self-consumption had become economically at-
tractive. Grid parity was reached in around 2012 for small residential systems: increasing 
retail prices for electricity and decreasing remuneration rates provided the economic ra-
tionale for self-consumption (Figure 11). 
In 2014 with the adoption of the fourth reform of the EEG, the government introduced an 
EEG surcharge on self-consumed electricity. However, this surcharge was less than the 
general EEG surcharge (in 2015 it was 30 percent of the regular EEG surcharge, in 2016 35 
percent and in 2017 40 percent). This provision was a reaction to the fear of an erosion of 
the solidarity principle in bearing the cost of the renewable energy support scheme. The 
argumentation is that as self-consumers satisfy their electricity needs partly with their 
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own power, they do not pay the EEG surcharge for all the electricity they consume, but on-
ly for the electricity they purchase from the grid. As an effect, all remaining consumers, 
who cannot or will not produce their own power have to bear more of the total cost for the 
support scheme, and this would result in an increase of the EEG surcharge10. 
Figure 12:  Economy of small-scale PV systems according to the rate of self-
consumption 
 
Source:  Own illustration (translation) based on data and illustration in ZSW 2014: 37. 
According to calculations in a study commissioned by the German Energy Ministry it be-
came clear that small-scale PV systems cannot operate economically without both self-
consumption and remuneration (ZSW 2014:37). Even with the current maximum rate of 
self-consumption (currently 20 percent is feasible) a residential PV system cannot operate 
economically without remuneration (Figure 12). Consequently, the study recommends not 
to extend the surcharge on self-consumed electricity to small PV system operators (ibid.). 
The regulator followed this recommendation and decided to exempt residential PV systems 
below 10 kWp from the EEG surcharge on self-consumption. 
                                            
 
10   Although the logic of the argument is understandable at first glance, it neglects the fact that the solidarity 
principle has already been eroded by those legal provisions, which exempt an extensive number of (more or 
less) energy-intensive companies from paying the (full) surcharge due to reasons of competitiveness.  
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2.2.2 Opportunities and barriers to increasing the rate of self-consumption in Germany 
By reaching grid parity self-consumption became, of course, the most important business 
model for the further expansion of residential PV power in Germany. However, grid parity 
alone does not suffice in significantly scaling up the rate of self-consumption. As a remind-
er: only a maximum rate of 20 percent self-consumption is currently feasible for small-
scale residential PV systems without significant changes in consumption patterns (AEE 
2014). The economically attractive operation of a residential PV system, on the other 
hand, is only feasible with a higher rate of self-consumption, i.e. 25 percent or more (ZSW 
2014: 37, see Figure 12). 
Technical studies suggest that an optimal match of the on-site demand can only be 
achieved with battery systems. With these storage capacities the rate of self-consumption 
can be scaled up to 70 percent. Other opportunities to increase the rate of self-
consumption, such as smart load or smart consumption management, are estimated to in-
crease this rate up to just 30 percent (AEE 2014). Both these options, however, are cur-
rently still characterized as economically unattractive for small prosumers for the follow-
ing reasons: 
a)  Potential to switch consumption patterns in households is low 
Households have the potential to save electricity, in part simply triggered by a visualiza-
tion of, and the feedback on, their own consumption patterns (Fischer 2008, Vine et al. 
2013, Fraunhofer ISE 2011). Households are equally able to shift consumption to a certain 
degree in order to respond to market signals given by load- or time-variable tariffs (e.g. 
Fraunhofer ISE 2011). However, studies have shown that these potentials are rather low.  
Table 1: Electricity-saving and load-shifting potential in households with smart meters  
Consumption/a 
 Saving potential        
in % 
Load shifting         
potential in % 
Cost savings 
in EUR/a and meter 
 
Mean Maximum 
< 2,000 kWh/a -0.5  0.25 – 5 2.0 4.50 
2,000 – 3,000 kWh/a -1.0  0.5 – 10 10.00 17.00 
3,000 – 4,000 kWh/a -1.5 0.75 – 15 20.00 35.00 
4,000 – 6,000 kWh/a -2.0              1 – 20 39.00 66.00 
> 6,000 kWh/a -2.5 1.25 – 25 75.00       130.00 
Source: Ernst & Young 2013: 159, own translation. 
In their cost-benefit analysis for a German rollout of smart metering systems Ernst and 
Young (2013) have summarized the findings of several studies and pilot projects to assess 
the impact of smart meters on energy saving and load shifting according to the amount of 
Prosumer: country report Germany 23 
 
 
electricity used in households (Table 1). Their analysis shows that the potential to save 
electricity or shift consumption — and, thus, save money — is in general rather low and de-
termined by the amount of electricity used. Households with high levels of consumption 
have in principle a higher potential. The spread of the respective potential within a given 
consumption class characterizes the variety of further factors which determine the poten-
tial to save electricity or to shift consumption, such as for example the type of feedback, 
the duration of the feedback, the tariff design and the type of electrical appliances in a 
household.  
b) The required technical infrastructure and price incentives are not in place  
Residential prosumer systems are already obliged to have meters or metering systems for: 
• power consumed from the public grid (consumption meter) 
• the number of kilowatt hours that are fed into the public grid and remunerated ac-
cording to the EEG (feed-in meter), and 
• the number of kilowatt hours produced by one’s own PV-system (yield meter). 
These meters guarantee a certain transparency and feedback on one’s own consumption 
pattern, but the majority of these meters are not smart in the sense of enabling intelligent 
communication with smart home appliances or an external control center to steer smart 
consumption or load patterns. Furthermore, the necessary smart appliances for such intel-
ligent communication are usually not in place, are costly and — for data security reasons — 
are also suspect for many private customers. Additionally, the required electricity tariffs 
which might trigger load shifting or electricity saving behavior are not offered by electrici-
ty providers due to established accounting rules for residential customers and the lack of 
adequate intelligent metering systems (see section 1.2.3). This results in a negative incen-
tive structure for electricity providers to offer tailored tariffs for residential customers 
(Tews 2011a).11 With the bill on “The digitization of the energy transition” adopted in June 
2016, the government introduces a step-by-step rollout of smart metering systems, which 
also have to be installed mandatory from 2017 in all residential prosumer systems with a 
capacity of >7 kWp. However, the primary reason for that provision is not to better match 
on-site demand with on-site production from the prosumer’s perspective, but rather to 
better match distributed feed-in of volatile renewable electricity with the grid’s capacity 
— and this especially from the security of supply perspective (see section 2.3.4). 
 
                                            
 
11  Electricity providers usually apply the Standard Load Profile (SLP) as an accounting rule for residential con-
sumers in Germany. SLP is used for approximating the customer’s electricity consumption, i.e. the con-
sumption pattern is fixed. Providers have no advantages in procurement based on SLP to pass on to custom-
ers. The lack of “smart” metering infrastructure to “individualize” consumption patterns prevents them 
from developing attractive tariff options (see Tews 2011a, for an English summary of the study see Tews 
2011b). 
24 Kerstin Tews 
 
c) Investment in storage capacity is still risky but early adopters seem to pave a way 
forward 
Currently, the market for stationary energy storage12 is still in its infancy. The acquisition 
costs for PV storage systems are currently relatively high. Investments in residential bat-
tery systems are still risky from an economic perspective due to the uncertainty of future 
returns, which depend on the development of variable factors, such as household electrici-
ty prices, remuneration rates for feed-in and surcharges on self-consumption.  
However, “early adopter” prosumers have started to invest in stationary storage capaci-
ties. Their motivation is rather to increase self-sufficiency and thus to reduce their de-
pendence on electricity from the grid instead of maximizing returns. Furthermore, with 
public grants for battery storage for systems <30 kWp being offered by the public KWF 
bank since May 2013 an additional market incentive was set.  
According to experts, further technological advancement of battery systems and the po-
tential decrease in storage prices will reduce investment costs and make them economical-
ly attractive from the prosumer’s perspective in the near future (Fraunhofer Um-
sicht/Fraunhofer IWES 2014). Combined with a further decline in EEG remuneration rates 
and rising household prices for electricity, a high growth potential for the storage market 
is expected. However, pioneer developers of storage and storage control systems (e.g. Tes-
la and Lichtblick) currently complain greatly about a range of uncertainties imposed by the 
over complex, partly unclear or unattractive German regulatory framework concerning 
electricity from battery storage. 
d) Concerns about the environmental desirability of certain options to increase the 
rate of self-consumption 
Some of the technical opportunities to increase self-consumption are ecologically undesir-
able such as the concept of “Power to Heat”. Although it can increase the rate of self-
consumption, the CO2 emission factor (CO2/kWh) of German electric power is — due to the 
German electricity mix (see Figure 1) — twice as high as the CO2 emission factor for heat. 
Thus, it is argued that PV power should replace fossil fuel power and be fed into the grid 
instead of being transformed into heat. 
2.3 Other relevant regulation 
In general, the German legislation on the deployment of renewable energy sources for the 
first phase of the energy transition process was intentionally designed to reduce the risks 
and the specific transaction costs for (potential) operators of a RES installation.  
                                            
 
12  The market for mobile energy storage (e-mobility) is even earlier in its infancy in Germany. Currently there 
is a major political debate on adequate instruments to stimulate e-mobility. The debate focuses on whether 
to subsidize the purchase via a premium or to better to improve infrastructure for e-mobility and/or the 
capacity of e-cars’ battery systems.  
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2.3.1 Grid connection provisions 
The provisions regarding grid connection, technical requirements, transmission and distri-
bution are regulated by several provisions of the Renewable Energy Act. Provisions in sec-
tion two of the law (“Connection, purchase, transmission and distribution”) clearly regu-
late the relationship between a grid operator and the operator of a RES installation and 
their respective obligations. 
According to section 8 of the law, a grid operator is obliged to offer the grid connection for 
installations to generate electricity from renewable energy sources without delay. This ob-
ligation generally applies to the grid operator technically suited for connection (grid volt-
age level) whose distance to the location of the installation is the shortest (linear). In the 
case of one or several installations with a total maximum installed capacity of 30 kWp 
which are located on a plot of land with an existing connection to the grid, the point of 
connection of the plot of land with the grid system shall be deemed the most suitable con-
nection point (informal English translation of the EEG13). 
• The operator of the RES installation has to place an application for grid connection to 
the respective grid operator. In reality the firm charged with the installation of the PV 
system by the private homeowner often assumes this application. 
• The grid operators must communicate to those wishing to feed in a precise timetable 
for the processing of the application to connect to the grid system. This timetable must 
state: 
o the procedural steps in which the application to connect will be processed, and 
o what information those wishing to feed in must transmit from their field of re-
sponsibility to the grid operators so that the grid system operators can deter-
mine the point of connection.  
• Grid operators must communicate the following information to those wishing to feed in 
within eight weeks:  
o a timetable for the establishment of the connection to the grid system compris-
ing all the necessary procedural steps 
o all the information needed by those wishing to feed in to test the connection 
point, and — on application — the grid system data required for a system com-
patibility check, and 
o an estimate of the costs incurred by the installation operators due to the con-
nection to the grid system; this cost estimate shall include only the costs result-
ing from the technical provision of the connection to the grid system, and in 
                                            
 




26 Kerstin Tews 
 
particular shall not include the costs of obtaining permission to use third-party 
real estate for laying the line to connect to the grid system. 
2.3.2 Building code regulations 
PV installations are subject to building law, which differs between the subnational jurisdic-
tions at state level in Germany (Bundesländer). However, roof-mounted PV systems — as a 
rule — do not require formal permission. PV installations on the roofs of historic buildings 
need a permit, but this is granted in most cases if the installation does not disrupt the 
building or alter its visual quality.  
2.3.3 Local planning practices 
Although the municipalities in Germany have the relevant competencies with regard to the 
main elements of spatial planning, respective legal provisions are not relevant for roof-
mounted PV systems as they do not have a spatial impact.  
2.3.4 Smart meter requirements  
As described in section 1.2.3 Germany is rather a latecomer to the development of smart 
grids and accordingly to the rollout of smart meters. Up until 2011 there were no smart 
meter requirements for small PV installations. In 2011 with the amendment of the Energy 
Industry Act (EnWG) the obligation for new PV installations >7 kWp to install smart meters 
was introduced.  
Recently a new legislation on smart meters rollout has been adopted. The scale of the 
rollout and the purpose of smart meters for prosumer systems were heavily contested in 
the political debate. Due to the rapid increase in volatile renewable generation capacities 
in the German electricity grid and the electricity market, the security of supply argument 
is becoming ever more important, calling for smart-grid integration of distributed renewa-
ble energy generation in order to better balance supply and demand.  
Accordingly, the technology and the associated debate on regulatory implications differs 
between basic bi-directional infrastructure to increased transparency of consumption pat-
terns in order to tap saving potentials (basic smart meters) and advanced intelligent me-
tering systems equipped with a so-called smart meter gateway which allows for remote 
readout of meters by an external control center (grid operator) in order to control grid-
optimized consumption and generation patterns. 
The new discussion on smart metering, particularly on integrating small prosumer systems 
into a smart grid, heated up with the publication of two studies in 2013 and 2014 (Ernst & 
Young 2013; Dena 1014) which recommended the installation of smart metering systems 
for the purpose of an “active feed-in-management” (i.e. cut-offs/curtailment of RES sys-
tems) by grid operators. These studies recommended the obligatory installation of smart 
metering systems even for small systems with a capacity of 0.25 kWp, or 0.8 kWp respec-
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tively. Both studies argue that these measures of active feed-in management would reduce 
the economic costs for further grid expansion.  
Complaints were heard especially from consumer protection associations, and the Federal 
Association for Renewable Energies (BEE) that the integration of such small residential sys-
tems would impose unreasonably high costs and risks (due to external cut-offs) to these 
small producers, which would prevent them from a further economically viable operation 
of their small PV systems. Furthermore they argue that grid operators will not depend on 
the provision of system services from such small residential producers in order to balance 
grid stability (VZ NRW 2014, Vzbv 2015, BEE 2015). 
In February 2015 the BMWi published its “Key Issue Paper on a Package of Ordinances Re-
garding Intelligent (Smart) Grids” (BMWI 2015), which included the following recommenda-
tions for prosumer systems which clearly refer to the security of supply argumentation: 
Small systems below 7 kWp are perceived as only potentially relevant for system stability 
in the future. However, PV systems >7 kWp are perceived as relevant for grid stability. 
Thus, the installation of advanced smart metering system should be obligatory by 2017 for 
all (new and existing) RES and CHP systems with a capacity >7 kWp. Systems with a capaci-
ty of between 0.8 kWp and 7 kWp are not obliged to install advanced smart metering sys-
tems. The ministry argues that currently the installed capacity of PV systems below 7 kWp 
accounts only for 7 percent of total installed PV capacity. However, by the year 2021, the 
ministry intends to evaluate, whether a smart system integration of this residential seg-
ment will be necessary from the security of supply perspective and economically feasible.  
Accordingly, the draft bill on the “Digitization of the energy transition”, published in No-
vember 2015, did not mention small residential prosumer systems, neither in the case of 
mandatory installation of smart meters nor as an option that meter operators can choose if 
they comply with the defined price caps (see Figure 4). 
However, the bill, as it was adopted on the 23th of June 2016 contains a surprising new 
provision which takes into consideration an amendment of the governmental coalition. For 
new small distributed installation between 1-7 kWp, the meter operators can optionally 
choose by 2018 to install smart metering systems if the comply with a price cap of 60 
EUR/a. The renewable energy branch, the opposition parties as well as consumer protec-
tion organizations were astonished by this last minute change. At time of finalizing this 
paper a detailed assessment of the background and the implications of this new provision 
is not yet available. 
2.3.5 Information practice and the third party market 
The degree of bureaucratic complexity and the burden for private households to become 
prosumers are rather low. Furthermore, due to actors having emerged in the third party 
market of the solar branch (installation firms, PV leasing firms) and the extensive infor-
mation provided by several actors, transaction costs have been further reduced. It would 
go far beyond the scope of this study to describe in detail the information practices of-
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fered by formal institutions at different levels of the German federal system, consumer or-
ganizations or associations in the solar branch. Thus, only a few examples are given below: 
Individualized energy-related counselling 
The federal consumer organization “Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.” and its de-
centralized member organizations at the state level offer as part of their on-site counsel-
ling on energy-related renovations of private homes, information on grant and subsidy pro-
grams for PV, renewable warmth and power storage, as well as individualized calculations 
and recommendations regarding the economic benefits of investing in the various 
measures. 
Online guidebooks and interactive calculation tools  
There are a couple of online guidebooks and interactive tools available to calculate the re-
turns offered by the roof conditions of a specific house. Such web tools are provided by 
different organizations and platforms in the solar branch. These webpages often directly 
forward the requests of an interested user to installer firms in their region.  
Solar land maps 
A few municipalities or counties (e.g. the county of Ahrweiler in Rhineland-Palatine) do al-
ready offer online solar land registers of their entire city or county. Such tools enable each 
homeowner to easily get an initial picture of the suitability of a roof-mounted PV system, 
as these registers show all houses and indicate whether or not a solar system can be oper-
ated economically.  
3 Conclusion: Prosuming and the moving targets in the German energy 
transition process 
With a total installed capacity of 38 GW (2015) PV power has reached a stage of systemic 
importance for the whole power system. Although residential PV (<10 kWp) accounts for 
only 13 percent of total installed PV capacity, it is an important segment for several rea-
sons: “Prosuming” — although never defined as an official term in Germany — is both a 
subject and driver of the adaptive legislation on the RES support scheme and on system in-
tegration of RES.  
From a historic perspective, the generation of PV by new, small-scale residential investors 
was implicitly intended by the “founding fathers” of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) in 
order to dismantle barriers imposed by the hesitant attitude of the established energy ac-
tors towards renewable energies (see Scheer 2005).  
Thus, the Renewable Energy Act has for a long period offered a high degree of planning se-
curity for investors and has sheltered small-scale and new actors’ investments to develop a 
long-term niche. The risk and transaction cost reductions ensured by:  
• the clear regulation of the relationship between PV operator and grid operator, and  
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• the long–term security of returns achieved by administratively fixing a technology-
specific remuneration for 20 years 
are especially relevant for those actors who cannot diversify risks and/or are unfamiliar 
with the established rules in the energy field. 
The success of the EEG stimulating precisely these small-scale actors to invest in residen-
tial PV forced once again adaptions to legislation and a change in the attitudes and strate-
gies of established energy actors. The rapid spread of residential PV provoked provisions, 
which introduced incentives to increase self-consumption in order to ensure grid stability. 
These residential adopters of the new technology became a critical mass and caused not 
only a rapid diffusion of this technology into the market but also decreasing system prices. 
The subsequent (rather late) reduction in remuneration rates and rising electricity prices — 
partly as a consequence of the EEG surcharge — created incentives to increase self-
consumption as an economic rationale for operating PV systems. This in turn stimulated re-
search and innovation in storage capacities on the one hand, but on the other the political 
need to increasingly consider security of supply issues and the solidarity principle in bear-
ing the costs of the transition process. 
Future regulations on incentives, which enable self-consumption, as the only economic ra-
tionale for operating a residential PV system, will increasingly face the need to differenti-
ate between: 
• an optimization of self-consumption rates from the prosumer’s perspective, or  
• an optimization of self-consumptions patterns from the system perspective. 
While the first perspective would guarantee the economic attractiveness of residential PV 
for the investor, the latter perspective is relevant for security of supply and would require 
a grid-optimized operation of prosumer systems. 
The latter gains systemic importance for the whole transition process, however it will 
probably come into conflicts with the interests of the individual prosumers. Such conflicts 
have to be counterbalanced with a respective incentive structure in order to reward a grid-
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